SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

1861.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861

IN THE

SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

A PAPER READ BEFORE THE COMMANDERY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 3, 1893,

BY

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1893.
Doylestown Publishing Company, Printers,
DOYLESTOWN, PA.

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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

The campaign of 1861, in the Shenandoah Valley, in which are included the movements in front of Washington and the battle of Manassas, was the initial campaign of the war. Its importance is underestimated. It resulted disastrously to our arms and led up to one of the bloodiest wars of modern times. In this campaign a greater force was employed than had ever before appeared on any one field in America.

When the conflict opened our people were ignorant of the art of war; they had been trained in the ways of peace, and, with the exception of the officers of our small Regular Army, the few who had served in Mexico, and still fewer who survived the War of 1812-15 with England, there were none who had ever "set a squadron in the field." We were called upon, suddenly, to lay down the implements of peace and take up the weapons of war, a fact that should never be lost sight of in treating of our early campaigns.

The Shenandoah Valley, where the combatants first measured their strength, is a mountain-locked region extending from Tennessee to Pennsylvania, and the gateway between the North and South. Its geographical position gives it great military strength; lying between the Allegheny mountains on the west and the Blue Ridge on the east, the latter pierced by several passes leading into the valley of the Potomac. It is watered by the Shenandoah river for the distance of two hundred miles, while the Potomac, in the nature of a great wet ditch, sweeps its northeastern border from Hancock to Alexandria. He, who holds the passes of the Blue Ridge and the fords of the Potomac, in time of war, threatens

the National Capital, and has an unobstructed road to the North.

It became evident to the authorities on both sides, at the outbreak of the war, that this valley would play an important part in the operations that would follow. The enemy made use of this natural covert-way to conceal the march of his armies in the invasions of '62 and '63, and, after defeat, he returned to this valley as to a city of refuge to regain his wasted strength. He was the first to take advantage of its military strength, by sending General Johnston with 4000 troops to seize Harper's Ferry and occupy both sides of the river, April 19th, the very day the Massachusetts 6th was fired upon in the streets of Baltimore.

The presence of an hostile force on our immediate frontier called for troops to oppose it, and Chambersburg, in the Cumberland Valley, was the place designated for their concentration. They began assembling the last of April, and, by the first of June, about 18,000 men, mostly Pennsylvanians, were under arms in a camp of instruction commanded by Major-General William H. Keim. On the 27th of April the Department of Pennsylvania, including this State, Delaware, Maryland and the District of Columbia, was formed, and Major-General Robert Patterson, a veteran of the War of 1812-15, and with Mexico, and who stood high with the General-in-Chief, was placed in command with headquarters at Philadelphia. He occupied himself forwarding troops for the defence of Washington, opening a new route from the North to the National Capital, via Annapolis. On the 21st of June, General Patterson left Philadelphia, and, proceeding to Chambersburg, assumed command of the troops assembled there. He at once took steps to complete their organization and prepare them for the field, forming them into two divisions of five brigades.

The plan of campaign embraced the movements of two columns; the main body under Patterson in person to march direct to the Potomac, while a "Secondary Expedition" was to ascend the left bank of that river from Washington, the two bodies to act in concert, or separately, as circumstances might require. When on the point of marching, a dispatch from the Adjutant-General of the Army ordered Patterson not to move until he was joined by a battery of the 4th Artillery and a battalion of the 3rd Infantry. This detained him until the 12th and he reached Hagerstown on the 15th.

The next day General Patterson received a dispatch from General Scott, directing him to send to Washington all his Regulars and the Rhode Island battery, thus stripping him of his most reliable troops, and leaving him without a piece of artillery, and but one company of cavalry a month in service. Patterson protested, but it was useless. If he were not in a condition to take the field *before* the Regular troops joined him, he was not in as good condition after these same Regulars had been taken from him, with the addition of his last battery. Here was a further delay of fifteen days which cannot be charged against the Commanding General. What changes might have been wrought in this period no one can tell, had Patterson's army been allowed to continue its march from Hagerstown without detention. Possibly the outcome of the campaign might have been reversed. No factor is more important in the game of war than time.

The movements of Patterson's army early attracted the attention of the Confederate military authorities at Manassas, and the very day he marched from Chambersburg Beauregard telegraphed Davis at Richmond: "The enemy seems to be taking the offensive towards Harper's Ferry, and, a few days hence, we may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical position as to render it impossible to relieve him."

While Patterson was waiting at Hagerstown for promised reinforcements, Scott, under date of June 20th, requested him to "propose a plan of operations," which he did on the 21st, embracing the following points:

1. To occupy Maryland Heights with one brigade and fortify and arm them;

2. To change the base of supplies to Frederick; abandon the present line of operations, and open a new one through Harper's Ferry;

3. To cross the Potomac near Point of Rocks, and unite with Stone at Leesburg.

While this was a direct proposition to abandon the false line on which Patterson was then moving, it did not receive the sanction of Scott and was abandoned. The wisdom of this plan, however, was confirmed by Halleck, who wrote of it a year later, saying: "Had Patterson crossed the Potomac at Leesburg, he would have threatened Johnston's communications much more effectually than at Martinsburg, and, at the same time, would have been near enough McDowell to assist him, or to receive assistance from him, as circumstances might have required." This plan would have changed Patterson's position from an exterior to an interior one, an advantage too patent to need discussion. It should be borne in mind that this took place a month before the battle of Manassas.

An order had been issued, in the meantime, for the concentration of the troops that were to form the "Secondary Expedition," on the Maryland side of the Potomac opposite Harper's Ferry. This column was placed in command of Colonel Charles P. Stone, 14th U. S. Infantry. Here was further delay. Scott wrote Patterson, June 8th, the movement would begin on the 10th, but it was eighteen days later. On the afternoon of the 28th, a battalion of the 25th Pennsylvania left Washington;

the weather was intensely hot, the dust deep and the men in heavy marching order. In this battalion I commanded a company. We overtook Colonel Stone at Poolsville hurrying forward; bivouacked at the mouth of the Monocacy the evening of July 3rd, fording that stream waist deep to the men, the morning of the 4th, and reached our destination on the 5th, in a march of sixty miles.

Stone's column was 2500 strong. The town of Harper's Ferry was in possession of the enemy, and on the evening of the day of our arrival some skirmishing took place between him and us, with little loss on either side. While our destination could only be guessed at when we left Washington, it was the general impression we were to join Patterson's column. What Stone's instructions were was not known, but no doubt they were liberal, for, as soon as his command was united, he planned an attack on Harper's Ferry for the morning of July 6th, the fording of the river to be covered by a body of sharp-shooters stationed on Maryland Heights. Everything was prepared to move at daylight, but, at three in the morning, our pickets brought in a couple of strangers, who proved to be couriers from General Patterson, with orders for Stone to join him at Martinsburg.

Meanwhile Patterson was at Hagerstown preparing for a forward movement when he should be in a condition to take that step. He had, at that time, 10,000 volunteer infantry, 650 cavalry and artillery and six guns, but no means of moving them; the harness for the battery arriving on the 29th of June. On the 25th he received the following dispatch from Scott:

"Remain in front of the enemy while he continues in force between Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in superior, or equal, force you may cross and attack him. If the enemy should retire upon his resources at Winchester, it is not enjoined that you should pursue him to

that distance from your base of operations, without a well-grounded confidence in your continued superiority."

General Patterson, feeling this order gave him the permission desired, made his final preparations to cross the Potomac. His troops were now concentrated at Williamsport. The strength of the enemy at this period is of some importance. Captain, afterward Major-General, Newton, U. S. Engineers, who had been two days collecting intelligence at Harper's Ferry, estimated it at 15,000 men, and 20 to 24 guns. The accuracy of this estimate is substantially confirmed by Johnston's own report, which makes it 13 regiments and 2 battalions of infantry, 4 companies of artillery, 16 guns, and 300 cavalry. Johnston left Harper's Ferry for Winchester as Patterson approached the Potomac and subsequently joined Stonewall Jackson at Darkesville. Patterson crossed the Potomac on the afternoon of July 2nd, and, just beyond Falling Waters, five miles from the river, encountered the advance brigade of the enemy, when a sharp action took place resulting in his rout, his camp and equipage falling into our hands, with some loss in killed and wounded on both sides. The next day he occupied Martinsburg, the enemy falling back to Big Spring, and afterward retiring to Winchester.

Beauregard, * in commenting upon Patterson crossing the Potomac into Virginia, says:

"At the time of my arrival at Manassas a Confederate army, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was in occupation of the lower Shenandoah Valley along the line of the upper Potomac, chiefly at Harper's Ferry, which was regarded as the gateway of that valley, and one of the possible approaches to Richmond; a position from which he was speedily forced to retire, however, by a flank movement by a Federal army under the veteran General Patterson, thrown across the Potomac above Martinsburg."

*See *Century*, November, 1884.

Stone's brigade left Sandy Hook the morning of July 6th to join Patterson at Martinsburg. Marching up the Potomac and striking through the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge, we reached Sharpsburg at three that afternoon. Here we halted for an hour to rest the men and get the team horses shod; the children of the town turning out to give us a reception, the girls wearing red, white and blue aprons. Resuming the march, we continued up the Sharpsburg turnpike, passed the Dunkard Church, the key to the battle of Antietam fought fourteen months later, and bivouacked that night in a piece of timber five miles beyond. The next day we reached Williamsport by noon, and forded the Potomac at sundown. Here an interesting incident took place that lifted the occasion above the stern realities of war. My regiment was the last to cross, and the opposite bank was lined with troops and citizens, including a number of ladies, to witness the crossing. As my own company entered the water, the men began singing in a full, clear tone:

"When I can read my title clear,
I'm in the stream a-drinking;
I'll bid farewell to every fear
I'm on my journey home.
"Glory to God!
I'm in the stream a-drinking,
Glory to God!
I'm on my journey home."

The effect of the singing was pleasing, and was kept up all the way across; and, as my company stepped upon the soil of Virginia, it was received with cheers by the lookers-on. We bivouacked that night in a field near by, and, the next morning, marched into Martinsburg passing over the recent battle field at Falling Waters.

We have now completed the first stage in the campaign, and our army has pitched its tents in the enemy's country. Before we move let us look back and take a glimpse at the situation. Since the army took the field

some mistakes have been made; two of them are obvious, delay and operating on the wrong line. General Patterson's detention of eight days at Chambersburg and fifteen at Hagerstown was by order of the General-in-Chief. Neither was he responsible for approaching the Potomac on a false line. Had Scott sanctioned his "Plan of operations," submitted by request the 21st of June, it would have entirely changed the campaign by placing the army of the Shenandoah on an interior line, and it might have been decided by legs instead of guns. The situation is interesting. There are three armies in the field with a single objective; Patterson is at Martinsburg confronting Johnston at Winchester; Beauregard at Manassas threatening the National Capital and holding the passes in the Blue Ridge; while McDowell is on the right bank of the Potomac opposite Washington, where he is assembling and organizing a fourth army to take a hand in the fray. It had been a long time since such keen interest was directed to military operations in this country.

We return to Martinsburg. While Stone's brigade is recovering from its forced march of 100 miles, and stores are being brought to the front, Patterson is preparing for a forward movement. His gross strength is about 17,000 men, but he would hardly be able to march with 15,000 at the outside. Johnston's army was equal in men and superior in guns. Patterson was charged with a double duty, to prevent Johnston joining Beauregard at Manassas, and defending himself from attack, a role in the game of war sometimes difficult to play at with success. As a direct march on Winchester down to this time had probably only been thought of, the order was issued on July 8th, but countermanded at midnight of the same day.

The next day Patterson called a council of officers, and, after a full conference and interchange of views, the

direct movement on Winchester was abandoned, every officer present voting for it. The reasons assigned were substantially the same; that the situation was exposed, and the present line a false one; that there should be a flank movement on Charlestown, and Johnston threatened from some other point; inadequate supplies and transportation, and the superior strength of the enemy and his entrenched position at Winchester. At this council board sat Colonel Crossman, Quartermaster, Captain Beckwith, Commissary, Captain Simpson, Topographical Engineers, Captain Newton, U. S. Engineers, Colonel Stone, Colonel George H. Thomas, and Colonel Abercrombie, of the Regular Army, all of whom had served in Mexico, and afterward won distinction in the late war; also Generals Negely, Keim and Cadwallader, two of whom saw service in Mexico.

Would Patterson have been justified in rejecting the advice of these experienced officers under the circumstances? I think not. The wisdom of their decision was confirmed two days later by the receipt of a dispatch from Adjutant-General Townsend, who stated that the plan of Johnston, recently come to light, was "to have drawn Patterson sufficiently far back from the river to render it impossible to retreat across it on being vanquished." General Scott had previously telegraphed Patterson, June 8th, what was equivalent to an endorsement of the decision in advance: "Take your measures circumspectly, make good use of your engineers and other experienced staff officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success. You will find the enemy strongly posted and not inferior to you in point of numbers." What is the clear inference from this? What do we understand by the expression, "Attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success?" It can have but one meaning; Patterson was to run no risks.

The next day after the conference of the 9th, General Patterson wrote General Scott, advising him of his movements:

"I propose to move this force to Charlestown, from which point I can more easily strike Winchester; march to Leesburg when necessary; open communication to a depot to be established at Harper's Ferry, and occupy the main avenue of supply to the enemy." To this General Scott replied on the 12th, saying:

"Go where you propose in your letter of the 9th inst. Should that movement cause the enemy to retreat upon Manassas *via* Strasburg, to follow him at this distance would seem hazardous, whereas the route from Charlestown *via* Keye's Ferry, Hillsboro and Leesburg towards Alexandria, with the use of the canal on the other side of the river for transportation may seem practicable. * * * * *Let me hear from you on Tuesday.*" The next day this order was substantially reiterated in another dispatch, adding: "Make demonstrations so as to detain him (Johnston) in the Valley of Winchester." The better to fulfill this injunction, Patterson postponed his march on Bunker Hill to the 15th, distance fifteen miles, reaching that place the middle of the afternoon. The only force encountered was 600 cavalry sent out from Winchester to cut off our advance should the opportunity offer. We lay here the 16th, during the day pushing a reconnoissance toward Winchester with pickets advanced to give notice of the enemy's approach should he leave his entrenchments. We found the roads obstructed by fallen trees, fences built across them and other well-known means taken to impede the march of an army.

We marched from Bunker Hill for Charlestown, distance 12 miles, about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, Stone's brigade leading. Our route lay through a beautiful and fruitful country. Our nearness to the enemy required every precaution against surprise; the column

was kept closed up, with skirmishers thrown out in front and on the flanks. During the forenoon word was passed that "the enemy is at hand," and soon mounted officers were dashing about giving orders for the formation. In a very brief space of time the infantry, cavalry and artillery had taken their positions, guns unlimbered, and

"Swiftly forming in the ranks of war."

The alarm proved to be a false one; the column was reformed and the march resumed. While it lasted, this little episode was thrilling to the young soldiers on their first campaign, feeling all the excitement of preparation for battle with none of the horrors that generally follow. The army reached Charlestown that afternoon, and encamped and bivouacked in its immediate vicinity. We were now sixteen miles from Winchester and twelve from Harper's Ferry.

A good deal of criticism has been indulged on this movement to Charlestown. It is charged that Johnston "eluded" Patterson, but Beauregard takes a different view of it. In his restrictions on Johnston's opposition to uniting with him, even after McDowell had struck his advance on July 17th, and was moving on Manassas, and the Confederate government "had ordered him, Johnston, to come, if practicable," he says in his "Battle of Manassas:"

"It appears, however, that about this time, July 18th, General Johnston ascertained that, on the *day previous*, General Patterson had already moved away to Charlestown, some twenty-three miles off, that is to say, had executed upon *him* the very movement of which he doubted the possibility on his own part; an important military action by General Patterson, which should have been earlier known to General Johnston, and, as threatening General Beauregard, made it imperative that he should, at least, have held himself in the nearest and readiest position to concentrate with him upon a moment's notice without an

order. As it stood, while General Johnston was doubting his ability to evade the enemy, the latter, on the 17th, was already far away from him at Charlestown, and was thus on the very edge of holding with McDowell the shorter lines." This is strong testimony coming from the enemy. The truth is, this change of base was advantageous from a military point of view; it was nearer Winchester, and the army was in a better position to make a forward movement, if considered necessary.

Although the position at Charlestown was advantageous for a forward movement, a circumstance over which General Patterson had no control, whatever, prevented him making use of it; his army was on the point of melting away. It was almost exclusively composed of three months' men, and the enlistment of 18 regiments, the flower of his force, would expire within seven days. They were paraded and the situation explained to them, but only three regiments agreed to remain ten days over their time. This was an unfortunate condition of things, but beyond remedy; an offensive movement was out of the question. Suppose the 30 days lost at the opening of the campaign, and without the fault of the Commanding General, could have been added to the time of the troops whose enlistment was about to expire, what opportunities it would have offered. There could have been no question then about a forward movement, and Johnston would have been obliged to fight his way to Manassas had he been able to reach it at all.

The General-in-Chief was kept fully advised of the situation. The next day after the army reached Charlestown, the 18th, General Patterson telegraphed him, "Shall I attack?" To this there was no response. And, although Patterson's army was expected to act in concert with McDowell, he was left in ignorance of the latter's movements from July 17th to the 22nd, when the disastrous result at Manassas was learned through the news-

papers. To the average military man, an explanation of this treatment would appear difficult; there is but one explanation that can be given, the dispatches were suppressed by some one in the interest of the enemy, for it cannot be supposed the General-in-Chief would neglect communicating with the army of the Shenandoah, at this critical period, for five days. At that time the enemy and his allies had general access to everything going on at the War Department.

General Scott had telegraphed Patterson to detain Johnston until the 16th; and as he was known to be at Winchester on the 18th, the day of our arrival at Charlestown, and the day after McDowell had "driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House," and would "probably" carry Manassas Junction the next day, as per Scott's dispatch of the 17th, General Patterson, in the absence of news from the General-in-Chief from the 17th to the 22nd, believed, and was justified in believing, that everything was progressing well with McDowell. Johnston, with a portion of his force, left Winchester on the afternoon of the 18th to reinforce Beauregard, and, as soon as the information reached General Patterson, he hastened to communicate it to General Scott. From Charlestown Patterson's army marched to Harper's Ferry, 12 miles distant, on the 21st, where it was disbanded, and the three months' regiments sent to their respective States to be mustered out of service.

The operations about Manassas are too closely connected with those of General Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley to be passed without proper reference thereto. Beauregard was assigned to the command of the Confederate army at Manassas, covering the direct road to Richmond, on which it was thought the main Federal army would operate, and Johnston to the army of Shenandoah to protect that Valley from Patterson's invasion;

the sole advantage, in occupying Manassas and the points adjacent consisting in holding interior lines.

Beauregard advised the concentration of a heavy force at Manassas, so that when McDowell should be sufficiently advanced from Washington, he could move around his convenient flank, cut his communications, cut off his retreat to Arlington, and, as a consequent, crush Patterson and capture Washington. Beauregard further developed his plans to Johnston, in a letter of July 13th. He advocated an advance from Manassas; Johnston to unite with him, leaving 5000 men to guard the passes in the Blue Ridge. He expected to have 40,000 men in a few days; first crush Scott and McDowell; then dispose of Patterson's army; next proceed to McClellan's theatre of war and treat him in the same way; and, finally, to cross the Potomac and operate in the rear of Washington; but this rather comprehensive plan was rejected by Davis and his military advisers.

The battle of Manassas, generally called Bull Run, was fought on July 21st. Beauregard's order of battle was issued on the night of the 17th, and, on the morning of the 18th the Federal army was massed around Centreville, and advanced on Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords where an unsuccessful attempt was made at crossing. McDowell spent the 19th and 20th in reconnoissances, and it is said that lack of provisions and the want of information detained him at Centreville. These were fatal days for the Federal arms, for, on the afternoon of the 20th, Johnston arrived with 6000 men and 20 guns from the Shenandoah, and Holmes, from Aquia Creek, with 1265 men and 6 guns, while Elsey's brigade, 1700 strong arrived on the field about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st. This latter was an unexpected reinforcement.

We again realize what an import factor time was in deciding this important battle, for, had it been fought twenty-

four hours earlier, the enemy's force would have been just 9000 men and 26 guns weaker. What would have been the result in such case is hardly an open question. Under the circumstances the defeat at Manassas was a crushing blow to us. Johnston, in his "Narrative," page 57, says of McDowell's operations: "If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we, (the Confederates) should have been beaten." McDowell was a competent officer, and his tactical faults referred to were largely due to untoward circumstances liable to happen at any time when operating with raw troops.

General Patterson has been severely and unjustly criticised for his operations in the Shenandoah Valley; he is even held responsible for the defeat of McDowell at Manassas. Several causes combined contributed to our misfortunes and no one is responsible. Mistakes were made, but we can now see where and how they could have been avoided. The hindsight is always better than the foresight.

I have already called attention to General Patterson's army approaching the Potomac on the wrong line, and, when corrected, after considerable loss of time, it was too late to profit by it. Delay in our movements was an important factor in our misfortunes; a loss of over thirty days in a campaign of sixty being something unheard of, but it cannot be chargeable to General Patterson. Both McDowell and Patterson were crippled by their troops being three months' men; and, when the latter was in a position to move against Johnston with effect, the enlistment of nearly his entire force was on the point of expiring.

At that period it was impossible to conceal our movements from the enemy. Patterson was operating in the enemy's country, and McDowell might as well have been, for Washington was filled with spies and the War Department had more leaks than windows and doors. Beau-

regard's proximity to Washington gave him great facility for obtaining intelligence from within our lines. On this point he says, in his "Battle of Manassas:" "Arrangements were made which enabled me to receive regularly from private persons at the Federal Capital most *accurate* information, of which politicians high in council, as well as War Department clerks, were the unconscious ducts." He tells how a trusted messenger obtained from a woman in Washington the time, almost to the very hour, the Federal troops would march on Manassas, which enabled him to make proper disposition of his forces.

There is not a doubt in my mind, that prior to Johnston marching from Winchester to reinforce Beauregard, July 18th, he was informed that Patterson's three months' regiments would not serve beyond their time. A soldier like Johnston knew in a moment this rendered Patterson powerless for offensive operations. He is likewise charged with leaving Scott in ignorance of Johnston's movements. This was said on the floor of the House, in face of the fact that Patterson's dispatch to Scott was in evidence before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War." A copy was produced to satisfy the doubters, of which some were members of that Committee. It was stated in the debate that sprung up, that Mr. Lincoln had knowledge of General Patterson's dispatch, and protested to Scott against McDowell attacking before Patterson joined him. The Confederates also knew of Patterson's dispatch, for Adjutant General Cooper telegraphed Beauregard on the 19th: "The enemy is advised at Washington of the movements of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his plans in conformity thereto." The understanding that McDowell was to attack Beauregard on the 16th, Scott communicated to Patterson as plainly as he dared under the circumstances. Patterson was expected to detain Johnston until that time; this he did and two days longer. Had Scott intended Patterson to attack Johnston at Winchester

from Charlestown, he would have so responded to his dispatch of the 18th. This would have prevented him reinforcing Beauregard, in time for the battle of the 21st, at least.

It has been frequently stated, that an officer of General Scott's staff was detected giving information to the enemy; that he resigned, went to Europe and remained until the close of the war. While preparing this paper, I wrote to an officer of high rank, now on the retired list, but on the staff of the General-in-Chief in 1861, and afterward in the Adjutant-General's Department, for information on this point. In reply he says: "Colonel H. L. S., a North Carolina man, was Aide to the General. He was left in New York in charge of the Head Quarter records, and did not come to Washington. I never sent him any important papers, but kept them in my own possession. He may be the member of the staff to whom you refer, for he resigned, and, I believe, went to Europe. I have no reason to suppose that he ever conveyed information to the South, but there was a good deal of talk about him, because he was a Southern man."

My correspondent further says: "There was a young man of a Virginia family who was a favorite of General Scott's, whom the General had appointed a second Lieutenant in the Army, and attached to his staff as Secretary. As the war thickened he tendered his resignation. I sent him in arrest to Governor's Island, N. Y., where he was kept until all danger of his using information that he had to the injury of the Union had passed, if he felt so disposed. He did give information to Mrs. Lee of the movement to occupy Arlington Heights, but that only caused her to move away from her house there. His resignation was, after a while, accepted and he immediately joined the Southern Army."

Before concluding, I will call a single witness to the stand and take his testimony as to General Patterson's conduct of the Shenandoah campaign; General George H. Thomas, hardly second to any of our great leaders in the war for the Union. In a letter written to General Patterson, from Atlanta, Ga., August 8th, 1864, he says:

"I should have advised a direct advance on Winchester, but for the character of the troops composing your army. They were all, with the exception of a couple of squadrons of the 2nd U. S. Cavalry and two batteries of Regular Artillery, three months' men, and their term of service would expire in a few days. Judging of them as of other volunteer troops, had I been their commander I should not have been willing to risk them in a heavy battle, coming off within a few days of the expiration of their service.

"I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed myself, that your management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests of the service, considering the means at your disposal, and the nature of the troops under your command."

Although General Patterson was refused a Court of Inquiry, his case has gone to a higher tribunal, that of History, whose verdict may be awaited with entire confidence that justice will be done.